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In the wake of prominent instances of bureaucratic defiance, supporters of Donald 
Trump’s presidency have taken to describing said bureaucrats and the departments 
and agencies they represent as part of a “deep state” seeking to maintain and wield 
power behind the scenes. Such claims can be understood as an attempt at character 
assassination with the end goal of undermining the reputations of bureaucracy and 
bureaucrats alike. Efforts to disseminate this propaganda across varied forms of 
media have been both sustained and forceful. Do such attempts to shape public 
opinion lead Americans to think less of prominent agencies, cabinet departments, and 
their leaders? The author utilizes an original survey experiment to examine if learning 
about what a deep state is, reading media members debate its reality, or hearing the 
President’s son declare it to be truth shapes attitudes toward the image of the CIA and 
the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense. Preliminary results reveal such 
propagandizing rarely changes how individuals think about bureaucracy. The rare 
instances in which it does affect attitudes reveal such arguments may be just as likely 
to improve bureaucratic reputation as they are to diminish it, with presidential 
approval at times conditioning outcomes.  
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Within days of the September 2019 revelation that a whistleblower had filed a complaint 
concerning President Donald Trump and a potential attempt on his part to leverage 
foreign aid to Ukraine in exchange for investigations into a political rival, Trump 
administration defenders immediately went on the attack. These defenders attacked 
former Vice President Joe Biden, his son Hunter, the media, and Ukraine itself, but some 
of the sharpest barbs were reserved for the intelligence community as well as the federal 
bureaucracy more generally (Bump, 2019). Representative Matt Gaetz (R-Florida) 
claimed there were “people in the intelligence community and other parts of the 
government who just have it out for the President,” while Senator Josh Hawley (R-
Missouri) went a step further, putting a familiar name to this cabal in declaring the 
whistleblower part of “another Deep State attack” (Bump, 2019).  
 Claims that a “deep state” (in which appointed leaders of departments and agencies, 
everyday bureaucrats, or both clandestinely pursue their own agenda rather than that of 
elected officials in order to maintain power, achieve goals, or promote values) exists and 
is wreaking havoc when it comes to implementing administration initiatives have been 
made since civil service reform was passed in the United States in the late 1800s 
(Friedman, G., 2017). Some say President Dwight D. Eisenhower was alluding to such an 
idea in describing a “military-industrial complex” in his 1961 farewell address, and 
supporters of presidents like George W. Bush and Barack Obama claimed such influences 
at times shaped foreign policy making (Taub & Fisher, 2017). However, discussions of the 
presence, power, and reach of a deep state have become increasingly commonplace during 
President Trump’s time in the White House.1 Moreover, such claims have been discussed 
and dissected ad nauseam by media members over the past several years, seeking to 
understand how Washington works and whether a deep state truly exists or is a 
conspiracy theory (and subsequently an effort at propaganda those in power use to 
distract and deflect with a “conscious intent of manipulation” (Silverstein, 1987, p. 51).   
In his 1965 book Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, Jacques Ellul 
describes propaganda as “techniques of psychological influence combined with 
techniques of organization and the envelopment of people with the intention of sparking 
action” (p. xiii). Those who spread propaganda consider both content (what ideas are 
likely to influence opinions?) and process (how might that influence be achieved?). One 
 
1 As evidence of this, Google Trends data reveal that between January 1, 2008 and February 29, 2020, 
the 10 months with the highest levels of searches for the phrase “deep state” have all occurred during 
Donald Trump’s time as president.  
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motivation underlying the research presented here is to consider what drives the use of 
the idea of a deep state as a stealthy culprit pulling the strings behind any bureaucratic 
defiance. In addition, this research endeavors to learn more about whether modern deep 
state claims have any serious and significant effect on how Americans look at their 
government. Why might such claims affect the reputation of the bureaucracy, and do they 
do so? The goal of some Trump supporters in claiming a deep state is behind moves like 
leaks or whistleblowing (or, to borrow from Ellul, the “action” they wish to “spark”) 
appears to be to assassinate the character of departments, agencies, and those who work 
within them in the eyes of average citizens. We know next to nothing about whether this 
strategy works, nor do we know which types of information are most likely to erode the 
public standing of those under attack. 
 This manuscript proceeds in the following manner. After a discussion of the 
literature on how elected officials attempt to control the bureaucracy and when and why 
bureaucrats might defy such attempts, I briefly chronicle the difficulties the presidential 
administration of Donald Trump has had keeping the bureaucracy in line. Supporters of 
his administration have used varied tools to try to bring the bureaucracy to heel, one of 
which is to undermine the reputation of a variety of agencies by linking them to a deep 
state. The reach and potential power of such a claim are examined through the lenses of 
research on propaganda, character assassination, conspiracy theory, and public and 
private sector reputation management. I then chronicle a survey experiment in which 
respondents are offered varying types of information (from Wikipedia, media experts, and 
the President’s son) on the concept and potential reality of a deep state. The experiment 
serves as an initial effort at answering three related research questions: 1) does exposure 
to information on a deep state shape attitudes toward bureaucracy and its leaders, 2) what 
types of information might be more potent than others, and 3) which types of people 
appear most susceptible to such claims? Preliminary findings reveal the rarity with which 
receiving such propaganda has significant impact on attitudes toward departments, 
agencies, and their leaders. In most instances, the reputation of the bureaucracy remains 
unaffected and efforts at character assassination fail. At times, deep state information 
leads to positive assessments of the bureaucracy, although at others, interaction between 
this information and approval of the president leads departments, agencies, and their 
leaders to face backlash. I close with a discussion of some of the limits of this research 
that might offer avenues for exploring the claim of a deep state further and some 
conjecture on the short-term future of the deep state argument. 
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Political Control (Or Lack Thereof) of the Bureaucracy 
As long as there has been a bureaucracy to control, politicians have sought to control it. 
Scholars of agency theory like Moe (1984) have illustrated how leaders (in the White 
House, Congress, or even at state and local levels) create bureaucracies with internal 
hierarchies to facilitate such control. Said leaders regularly attempt to use tools such as 
appointments, dismissals, reorganization, oversight, personnel, and budgeting to keep 
departments and agencies under their purview in line (Wood & Waterman, 1991).  
Just because a leader wields such power, however, does not guarantee fealty to that 
leader’s mission. Bureaucrats in general are often depicted as focusing on growing their 
budgets and protecting their turf, doing whatever possible to stave off change (Golden, 
1992). As Brehm and Gates (1999) note, bureaucrats have their own policy preferences, 
often make political decisions, have discretion in decision making, and listen to other 
voices beyond those of elected officials; such voices might include supervisors, peers, or 
clients. Moreover, bureaucracies also bring their own values to the process of making 
decisions on how to best represent the public (Meier & O’Toole, 2006). Such factors might 
lead to what O’Leary (2019) calls “guerilla government,” whereby those in public service 
disobey the people (be they elected or appointed) in charge of them. Their capacity for 
doing so is at times facilitated by the ability to stay clandestine in their defiance (O’Leary, 
2019). Bureaucratic willingness to be responsive to or resist might also be conditioned by 
the history of responsiveness or resistance within a department or agency itself (Golden, 
2000). One potential outcome of a disconnect between what leadership wants and what 
bureaucrats want is sabotage, what Brehm and Gates describe as “negative output” (1999, 
p. 30). Not all negative output of this sort is of equal impact; some defiance is forever 
unknown by those in charge, while other actions can be quite public and damaging 
(O’Leary, 2010). When threatened, bureaucrats might band together behind the scenes to 
try and improve their footing or appeal to outsiders like Congress or the media to generate 
broader impact (Golden, 1992).  
 Such disconnects between presidents and the bureaucracy have happened with 
regularity throughout the history of the United States. However, it can be argued that 
throughout his first term in office, President Donald J. Trump has clashed with 
bureaucrats with a regularity, a breadth, and a depth perhaps never seen before in 
executive-bureaucratic relations. Within days of Trump’s inauguration, the White House 
found itself battling what they perceived as “negative output” from bureaucrats big and 
small, at times openly and publicly and at others clandestinely. In late January 2017, 
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Acting Attorney General Sally Yates refused to enforce the administration’s travel ban. In 
July of 2017, the Senate Homeland Security committee reported nearly daily national 
security leaks, and at a rate higher than previous administrations Republican or 
Democratic (Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2017; Crowley, 
2017). Just one month later, Environmental Protection Agency officials tipped off The 
New York Times about the potential quashing of a report on climate change (Crowley, 
2017; Friedman, L., 2017). The following year, in September of 2018, The New York Times 
published an anonymous essay entitled “I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump 
Administration” that chronicled government officials ignoring presidential directives 
(Anonymous, 2018). These are only a handful of the many examples of moments where 
bureaucrats expressed a willingness to defy what the Trump White House wanted or stood 
for.  
The Trump administration’s willingness to fight back against bureaucrats seen as 
unwilling to carry out policy aims can be measured in a number of ways. As Wood and 
Waterman (1991) illustrate, the appointment power is crucial to control. No one can deny 
a willingness on the part of the Trump White House to use this power with great regularity 
(and sometimes multiple times for the same position) to get preferred results; in the first 
2 and a half years of his presidency, Trump turned over more positions in the Cabinet (9 
of 15 spots) than any of his 5 predecessors did throughout an entire term (Gregorian, 
2019b). Another perspective on using appointment powers has been the Trump White 
House’s choice to give bureaucrats acting or interim control, or to not appoint anyone to 
fill vacancies at all. By one account in the summer of 2019, the Trump administration had 
over a dozen acting officials in key bureaucratic leadership roles that had yet to be 
submitted for Senate confirmation (Rod, 2019). Additionally, according to estimates in 
spring 2019, over 100 high-level bureaucratic positions had no nominee at all, while 
another 100+ were awaiting confirmation by the Senate (Gregorian, 2019a). According to 
some accounts, an overall philosophy of shrinking the bureaucracy (in terms of both 
money and manpower) has led to lower morale and difficulty in hiring due to the 
unattractiveness of government work as a career (Rein, 2017).  
Another path by which the Trump White House and its supporters throughout 
government, the media, and the public have attempted to rein in the bureaucracy is by 
trying to win a battle over reputation. As scholars have illustrated (e.g. Arnold, et al., 
2003; Bankins & Waterhouse, 2019; Carpenter & Krause, 2012; Hutton, et al., 2001; 
Luoma-aho, 2007; Maor, 2014; Wæraas & Sataøen, 2015), reputation management is a 
key facet of the relationship constructed and maintained between citizens and entities 
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from public sector government agencies and departments to private sector interest groups 
and corporations. With positive reputations come greater legitimacy (Wæraas & Sataøen, 
2015), and greater autonomy (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). Bureaucratic departments and 
agencies may not have the resources to build enormously positive reputations, so doing 
enough to maintain a neutral reputation may be sufficient to hold onto the public’s 
perception that an entity is professional, trustworthy, cooperative, willing to serve, and 
for the common good (Maor, 2014). Reputation may also be crucial in situations where 
external threats arise (Hood, 2011). One such external threat to bureaucratic autonomy 
might be a White House seeking to wield greater control.  
Propaganda and Character Assassination as Bureaucratic Control 
As described by Carmeli and Tishler (2004), reputation is about competitive advantages. 
Propaganda can be crucial to creating such advantages. Jowett and O’Donnell (2018, p.6) 
characterize propaganda as “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, 
manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired 
intent of the propagandist.” What that “attempt” (as Jowett & O’Donnell put it) 
constitutes can mean many things to many people. It might take the form of something 
seemingly benign, like advertising (Cunningham, 2010), or public relations (Gelders & 
Ihlen, 2010). It might be agitating the public to take action, or it might be reshaping 
thought processes moving forward (Ellul, 1965). In some instances, it involves something 
much more malign, like “lies, distortions, fabrications, and exaggerations…manipulation, 
and brainwashing” (Cunningham, 2010, p. 13).  
Such competitive advantages can be gained by building one’s own reputation up, 
or by tearing one’s competitor’s reputation down. The speed with which departmental and 
agency actions (overt or covert) that run counter to White House directives are labeled as 
related to a deep state can be viewed as an example of the latter. It is a form of, to use a 
term chronicled as of late by authors like Icks, Shiraev, Keohane and Samoilenko (2020), 
character assassination. Character assassination is typically thought of in terms of its 
effects on individual leaders (be they modern or historic), but it has also been studied in 
the context of specific nations, policies, forms of media, and facets of government (Icks & 
Shiraev, 2014; Icks et al., 2020). Attempts at character assassination, according to those 
who study it, have 5 pillars: the attacker, the target, the medium, the context, and the 
audience (Icks et al., 2020). When it comes to claims of a deep state, the attackers are 
many (but typically elected Republicans or media pundits), the targets are widespread 
(but the label has been applied to many an agency, department, or bureaucrat deemed to 
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have undermined the White House), the medium varies (from speeches to social media 
to mainstream and alternative press), and the context as of late has been the first term of 
the Trump presidency and the administration’s success or lack thereof in accomplishing 
goals. The audience appears to be the American people, but this research hopes to shed 
greater light on whether or not those making a deep state claim have a reach that exceeds 
their grasp.  
Character assassination is also both intentional and public (Icks et al., 2020). 
Those claiming a link between bureaucratic independence and a deep state intentionally 
use the phrase “deep state” not only because it is familiar to some, but also because the 
spirit underlying the phrase is timely (a necessity for successful propagandizing, 
according to Ellul, 1965) and resonates with many. As a 2018 Monmouth University Poll 
showed, 37% of Americans were either very familiar or somewhat familiar with the term 
deep state, but after hearing a description of the idea 71% said that it definitely or probably 
exists (Monmouth, 2018). Even if one is not familiar with the term, one might buy into it 
if one is like a clear majority of Americans and feels they can’t trust in government (Pew 
Research Center, 2019).  
Proponents of the deep state claim also use the phrase publicly. Ellul (1965) notes 
that for propaganda to succeed in achieving its goals, the propagandist “must utilize all 
the technical means at his disposal” (p. 9). Those willing to further the idea of a deep state 
have taken to traditional forms of media (e.g. print and broadcast media) as well as new 
technologies (e.g. social media) to link this premise with bureaucratic defiance. As 
described earlier, Senator Josh Hawley made his claim that a deep state was behind the 
Ukraine whistleblower story in a Fox News interview. When the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency gave an exclusive briefing to a handful of senators on the killing of 
Washington Post reporter Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi Arabia, Senator Rand Paul (R-
Kentucky) claimed said exclusivity was the result of the power of a deep state, and did so 
to both the Associated Press and his Twitter followers (Paul, 2018a; 2018b). Even the 
President himself has used such language, and with increased frequency over time during 
his presidency (Rohde 2020). Examples include mentioning the “Deep State Justice 
Dept” in a tweet regarding investigating the security practices of his 2016 opponent 
Hillary Clinton’s aide Huma Abedin, and his calling the State Department the “Deep State 
Department” in a press conference (Trump, 2018; Woodward, 2020).  
Elected officials directly attempting to undermine the character of the bureaucracy 
via such propaganda hope for powerful effects, but the extent of their influence might be 
limited to those who feel a kinship with the speakers themselves (Pornpitakpan, 2004). 
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Asch’s (1948) experiments reveal that individuals’ interpretation and incorporation of 
information can be conditioned by who authored it. As such, getting a broader set of elites 
to talk about such statements gives attempts at propaganda greater depth and resonance. 
Key also to the public face (and perpetuation) of the deep state claim is the extent to which 
mainstream media have been willing to openly debate its reality, filling inches of columns, 
minutes within the televised 24-hour cable news cycle, webpages, and tweets in the 
process. As Ellul (1965) notes, the media do not become instruments of propaganda 
automatically. Key to getting a self-sustaining discussion of the concept going has been 
these repeated claims of the deep state’s existence by a variety of elite sources across 
different forms of media. This begins a conversation between experts and pundits, which 
later begets more serious stories written by mainstream newspapers, television shows, 
magazines, and websites about the nature of the debate taking place. The regularity with 
which prominent journalists have discussed whether a deep state exists has gone far to 
elevate the concept in political circles and potentially expose the concept to mass 
audiences. Journalists in the pages of hard news publications like The New York Times, 
Newsweek, Time, Politico, and The Washington Post all discussed, in long form articles 
devoted solely to the topic, the potential existence of a deep state within the first year of 
the Trump presidency (Abramson, 2017; Crowley, 2017; Porter, 2017; Taub & Fisher, 
2017; Weigel, 2017). Later, so too did authors in pop cultural venues like Rolling Stone 
(Hafford, 2018). Propaganda’s broader success is facilitated by a variety of sources 
delivering the same message (Harkins & Petty, 1981). The higher the overall volume of 
stories that said variety builds to, the more likely propaganda is to flourish (Paul & 
Matthews, 2016). As Iyengar and Kinder (1987) illustrate, such elite media behavior can 
not only set the agenda for those consuming it, but it can also prime how judgments are 
made and frame which elements of a story are most essential.  
Character assassination of this sort may at first blush be about tearing down the 
reputation of one’s opponents and undermining them, perhaps out of revenge (Icks et al., 
2020). It may be an attempt to make bureaucrats or bureaucracy look like part of 
something sinister, shadowy, and power hungry. It may make departments, agencies, and 
their leaders appear as if they are enemies looking out for themselves or their entity 
instead of the executive branch or the American people. It has the potential to diminish 
trust, confidence, and approval as well. However, there are often other related goals is 
mind. Often there is a prize of some sort that the attacker and the attacked are in direct 
competition for. As discussed earlier, power and control are often at stake in the back and 
forth between a White House and the bureaucracy. Propagandists see information 
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dominance as necessary to winning this sort of back and forth (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2018). 
Leaving rogue actions (actual or otherwise) by bureaucrats publicly unanswered has the 
potential to threaten that dominance. Soon after inauguration, the Trump administration 
saw bureaucratic leaking as a roadblock in accomplishing goals to rival President Obama’s 
successes during his first 100 days in office (Rucker, Costa, & Parker, 2017). Months later, 
the bureaucracy (especially those entities related to intelligence gathering) was seen as 
conspiring to prevent President Trump from succeeding in attempts to keep his 2016 
campaign promise of “draining the swamp,” perhaps undermining the outcome of the 
election itself in the process (Porter, 2017). It is no surprise then that both of these 
moments (as well as several others since then) necessitated, as Ellul (1965) describes, a 
coherent response, one that takes events that might be vague or unclear and strives to 
organize them in the minds of members of the public. The idea of a deep state brings 
coherence to seemingly unrelated efforts on the part of bureaucrats across varied agencies 
with varied policy interests and influences to challenge a president’s power. It also allows 
for blame to be shifted and scapegoating to take place, another set of weapons wielded by 
character assassins (Icks et al., 2020). 
Conspiracy Thinking as Conduit of Propaganda 
Why might those who promote the deep state claim feel such propaganda will resonate 
with a certain percentage of the public? One answer might lie in, as Goldwag (2012, p.14) 
described it, “America’s long-standing penchant for conspiracy thinking.” According to 
Barkun (2003), individuals who believe in conspiracies see everything happening by 
design and nothing happening randomly. Conspiracy theories also often have elements of 
powerful individuals or groups secretly wielding control over politics and society (Fenster, 
2008). Conspiracy theorizing is done by individuals from all walks of life, across 
characteristics like level of education and political ideology (Oliver & Wood, 2014; 
Olmsted, 2009; Pipes, 1998; Uscinski & Parent, 2014); however, at times specific 
conspiracies do flourish with specific subgroups (Oliver & Wood, 2014). For example, 
partisans who feel threatened believe in conspiracy theories about their opponents 
(DiGrazia, 2017). Regardless of who believes, conspiracy theories, in the minds of those 
who believe them, often evoke a battle between dangerous, power-hungry conspirators 
and democracy itself (Dean, 1998; Sobiech, 2014).  
What is it about the concept of a deep state that resembles what we think of as 
conspiracy theorizing? Sobiech (2014) argues that conspiracy theories require facts and a 
meaningful plot, and the idea of a deep state has both in great supply. Stories of 
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bureaucrats acting contrarily have been commonplace during the Trump presidency, and 
the idea that they’re doing so for selfish reasons (be it to maintain power or undermine 
the president) makes for a compelling and potentially impactful story. The 
aforementioned “I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration” essay 
published in 2018 is an excellent example of the sort of plot (someone is secretly trying to 
undermine the president) and facts (The New York Times has verified the author’s 
identity) to which Sobiech alludes. To borrow from Barkun (2003), such conspirators are 
often not acting randomly, but instead are part of a broader design within departments 
and agencies we know have power regardless of who holds the White House. Some of the 
agencies associated with a deep state (e.g. the CIA) are also known for secrecy, further 
lending credence to the idea they might have the means to undermine a presidency in 
clandestine fashion. Additionally, conspiracies often have an element of government 
mismanagement to them as well (Olmstead, 2009), a claim that could be at the core of 
those who believe government departments and agencies have erred in contradicting the 
White House.  
This propensity toward conspiracy on the part of some of the public is potentially 
powerful when fused with existing feelings about government, the expectations we have 
about who bureaucrats are in power to serve, and the extent to which the actions that 
draw deep state accusations run counter to those expectations. The bureaucratic actions 
that some have attributed to a deep state may trigger a mental “surveillance system” 
(Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000), wherein individuals sense novel threats and 
search for ways to emotionally process such experiences. Belief in a deep state may allow 
some to maintain greater consistency in their attitudes about multiple facets of 
government as well, minimizing cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). It may also be 
easier than undertaking the difficult task of contemplating the specifics of each new 
bureaucratic development; as Rosenberg (2008) discusses, individuals regularly struggle 
to learn and comprehend complex information in modern society.  
The idea of a deep state may have a familiarity to it that makes it worth considering. 
In some ways, it evokes the long-standing concept of a military-industrial complex that 
President Dwight Eisenhower mentioned in his farewell address, but that scholars studied 
before his departure from the White House and in the six decades since (Baack & Ray, 
1985; Ledbetter, 2011; Mills, 1956; Moskos, 1974). Such a concept had become so 
mainstream in American culture in the middle of the 20th century that, according to 
Pilisuk and Hayden (1965), more than 20 books were published on the topic in the 1950s 
and 1960s alone. Rohde (2020) argues that this facet of the deep state idea has appeal to 
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liberals, while conservatives are more likely to buy in due to their desire for a powerful 
presidency (and the view that bureaucracy provides a roadblock to that). Modern 
Americans of all political persuasions also have grave concerns about whether they can 
trust government to do what is right (Pew Research Center, 2019). Only 17% of Americans 
feel government does what is right “just about always” or “most of the time.” As such, 
specific elements of government must continuously fight a battle to earn and then 
maintain a reputation of trustworthiness amidst an atmosphere of skepticism. This battle 
takes place amidst others over power, goals, and territory that threaten the ability of 
departments and agencies to fulfill their missions (Bendor, Taylor, & Van Gaalen, 1987).  
According to Carpenter (2010), the bureaucracy considers several facets of 
reputation that might matter to the public. One facet of agency reputation, according to 
Carpenter, is procedural, the extent to which it follows rules and norms. If a bureaucrat, 
an agency, or a department is leaking information or blowing the whistle on what it 
considers malfeasance, the possibility exists that such an action will be seen as straying 
from how bureaucracy normally functions. Another of these is what Carpenter calls moral 
reputation, wherein outsiders might consider the extent to which an agency protects 
stakeholder interests. Who an agency’s stakeholders are, however, might differ from one 
person to the next. Some might see the American people as stakeholders when it comes 
to the entirety of government, while othersmight believe agencies first and foremost serve 
at the pleasure of the president. 
To learn more as to whether attempts at disseminating deep state-related 
propaganda undermine the reputation of the bureaucracy, I conducted a survey 
experiment. This experiment endeavored to answer three related research questions:  
 
RQ1: Does exposure to information on a deep state shape attitudes toward 
bureaucracy and its leaders? 
RQ2: What types of information might be more potent than others? 
RQ3: Which types of people appear most susceptible to such claims? 




The survey was constructed in Qualtrics and conducted via Amazon Mechanical Turk in 
September of 2019.2 After consenting to take part in the survey, participants completed 3 
screening questions on income, party identification, and whether they lived in an urban, 
suburban, or rural area. The goal of this section was to guarantee partisan diversity in the 
respondent pool without tipping the respondent off as to the survey’s intent.3 
The 322 survey respondents were then randomly sorted into 1 of 4 treatment 
groups. 3 of these groups received varying amounts and levels of information on the 
concept and potential presence of a deep state in the United States; the 4th group served 
as a control. What I will call the “Definition Group” received the first paragraph of the 
Wikipedia entry on the concept of a deep state. This paragraph delivered a 
straightforward definition of a deep state (“a form of clandestine government made up of 
hidden or covert networks of power operating independently of a state’s political 
leadership, in pursuit of their own agenda and goals”), a list of what types of departments 
or agencies might take part, and possible motivations for deep state activity (Wikipedia, 
2019).4  
What I will call the “Expert Group” also read this Wikipedia definition to begin, 
but then read excerpts from a February 2017 article in The New York Times on how leaks 
within and around the Trump White House have led some to compare the situation to a 
deep state (Taub & Fisher, 2017). In this article, the question of whether the United States 
is seeing its own deep state is pondered by discussing the normality and abnormality of 
 
2 Amazon Mechanical Turk (or mTurk for short) has been a popular resource for public opinion 
research by academics for over a decade. With this popularity has come great scrutiny as to best 
practices for conducting mTurk surveys (see Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011; Huff & Tingley, 2015; Levay, Freese, & Druckman, 2016; Mullinix, et al., 2015; 
Paolacci & Chandler, 2014; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Much of this literature has praised 
mTurk for providing high quality respondents, while at the same time suggesting researchers be 
conscious of how mTurk participants differ from the public at large. I heed such advice in the 
construction of my survey and in the analysis of my findings, controlling for many of these 
aforementioned differences.  
3 Quotas were used to ensure both Democrats and Independents were not drastically oversampled; 
previous mTurk surveys have revealed respondent pools that leaned more Democratic than the 
population at large.  
4 The text of all treatments used in this experiment can be found in Appendix A. 
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leaks and the conflict between White Houses (present and past) and the bureaucracy. 
Barack Obama and George W. Bush-era struggles with leaks are mentioned, the 
perspective of a political science professor on the topic is mentioned, and the escalation 
of the issue in the Trump White House is addressed. This treatment group is meant to 
mimic one of the paths propaganda typically takes, wherein elites discuss the message in 
the mass media.  
Finally, what I will call the “Partisan Group” began by reading the Wikipedia 
definition just like the Definition Group and the Expert Group did, but they then read a 
July 2017 tweet from Donald Trump Jr., son of President Donald Trump. In this tweet, 
the president’s son retweets a Drudge Report tweet that states “Admin Hit With AT 
LEAST One National Security Leak a Day” (Drudge, 2017). Trump Jr. adds “If there was 
ever confirmation that the Deep State is real, illegal & endangers national security, it’s 
this. Their interests above all else” (Trump Jr., 2017). This treatment group is meant to 
mimic another path propaganda typically takes, wherein elite co-partisans take their 
message directly to the people. In this instance, the path by which that message is 
conveyed is via a social media following.  
Participants in all 3 of these treatment groups (plus the control group) were then 
asked questions about the performance of prominent departments and agencies. These 
departments and agencies included the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of 
Defense, Department of State, and Department of Justice. Departments and agencies like 
these, to one extent or another, have either modern ties to the concept of a deep state 
based on claims made by elected officials, administration staffers, or media pundits. 
Questions specifically asked included trustworthiness, whether these departments and 
agencies prioritized preserving their own power and status or helping serve the American 
people, and approval of the secretary or director in charge. Respondents were also asked 
more generally if unelected or appointed officials have too much influence in determining 
federal policy and to what extent the president should have the power to replace existing 
bureaucrats. Finally, participants in the Definition, Expert, and Trump groups were asked 
if they were familiar with the concept of a deep state before they took the survey, as well 
as if they believe a deep state exists.5 The survey closed with a demographic and political 
questionnaire in which respondents were asked about gender, sexual orientation, race 
 
5 Specific questions used in the analysis portion of this manuscript can be found in Appendix B. 
Questions pertaining to unelected/appointed officials’ influence and respondent belief in a deep state 
were drawn from a March 2018 survey (Monmouth, 2018).  
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and ethnicity, age, income, education, religiosity, ideology, party identification, news 
consumption, and presidential approval.6 Such questions revealed that the sample was 
74% white and 58% male. About 1/3 of respondents were under the age of 30, while about 
15% were 50 or older. The modal educational category (37%) had earned a bachelor’s 
degree. In total, we can see that our sample is whiter, more male, younger, and more 
educated than the general public. The modal income category (32%) lived in a household 
that earned between $25,000 and $49,999 a year. 86% of respondents did not identify as 
gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Nearly a third of those surveyed identified as liberal or very 
liberal, while about a fifth identified as conservative or slightly conservative. Attitudes 
toward politics (as measured through party, ideology, and feelings about President 
Trump) were relatively similar across treatment groups. Overall, the data also align with 
a vast array of research (see Footnote 2 for examples) that illustrates how mTurk samples 
regularly differ from the general public in predictable but rarely problematic ways.  
Findings 
We begin by considering general attitudes of our sample on the bureaucracy writ large. 
Such survey findings might offer insight into the public’s overall relationship with 
government beyond just elected officials and prominent institutions like Congress or the 
Supreme Court. Only 31% of our respondents felt that unelected or appointed officials 
have too much influence; the other 69% believed there is the right balance between 
elected and unelected officials. On the question of how much latitude presidents of one 
part should have in replacing government officials who took their positions under the 
administration of an opposing party, respondents were quite middling in nature. The 
modal response was “a moderate amount,” chosen by 46% of those surveyed. 
Respondents were a bit more likely to select “a lot” or “a great deal” (31% total) than they 
were to say “a little” or “none at all” (23% total).7 
As stated earlier, we focus our analysis of the relationship between reading about 
the deep state and attitudes toward bureaucracy on three specific dependent variables: 
trust in a department or agency, job approval of the secretary or director charged with 
leading the department or agency, and whether the department/agency preserves their 
 
6 Demographic and political questions are available from the author upon request.  
7 Multivariate modeling not presented here reveals that the only variable that significantly predicts 
how one feels about replacing government officials appointed by another party’s administration is 
approval of President Trump.  
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own power and status or serves the American people. The first two of these variables are 
ordinal in nature, and   as such ordered logit modeling is used to determine whether 
significant statistical relationships exist. The third variable is dichotomous and a logit 
model is used there. We focus our inquiry on 4 departments and agencies regularly 
associated with the conversation about a deep state: Defense, State, Justice, and the CIA. 
Tables 1 and 2 reveal the impact of key variables of interest on attitudes toward 
departments, agencies, and their leaders. The clearest takeaway from these models in 
total is that there are rarely significant relationships between exposure alone to 
information on a deep state and attitudes toward departments and agencies. The Expert 
treatment (where respondents read the media story in addition to the definition) is the 
most successful, significant in 3 of 12 cases. In all 3 cases, the Expert treatment was linked 
with more positive feelings toward departments and their leaders. In general, those 
exposed to this treatment are more likely to trust the Department of Defense and approve 
of the job Secretary of Defense Mark Esper is doing. They are also more likely to believe 
the CIA’s priority is to serve the American people. Such findings illustrate a potential for 
the deep state argument to backfire; institutions and their leaders alike were viewed 
significantly more positively in this handful of instances. Those exposed to the Partisan 
treatment (the tweet from Donald Trump, Jr.) were less likely to approve of the job CIA 
Director Gina Haspel is doing. In no cases was exposure to the Definition treatment 
significantly linked with questions of bureaucratic trust, leader approval, or department 
or agency priorities in terms of who is served.  
In some cases, how a respondent feels about how the president is doing his job is 
related to how that same respondent feels about departments, agencies, and their leaders. 
This is clearest when it comes to individuals appointed to lead. Perhaps this is because 
these appointees are more directly tied to the president than departments and agencies 
themselves. Those who approve of Donald Trump’s job performance as president also 
approve of Mark Esper’s performance as Secretary of Defense, Mike Pompeo’s 
performance as Secretary of State, and William Barr’s performance as Attorney General. 
In fact, attitudes toward the Justice Department are positively linked to presidential 
approval across the board.  
Perhaps, however, the interaction of these two variable types, receiving 
information about the deep state and feelings about the job Donald Trump is doing as 
president, might offer additional insight into how such messages matter. As discussed 
earlier, concepts like the deep state, in that they resemble other conspiracy theories, might 
thrive amongst specific political subgroups. Interactions at the bottom of Tables 1 and 2 
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illustrate how, in several cases, reading an informational treatment on the deep state and 
approving the job Donald Trump is doing as president is significantly linked with 
backlash against departments, agencies, and their leaders. This effect was most 
prominent amongst those who read the Expert treatment. Those who read the Expert 
treatment and also approved of the president were less likely to trust the Department of 
Defense and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, and more likely to believe the Department 
of Justice and CIA were looking out for their own power and status. Decreased trust in 
the Department of Justice was also linked with the combination of exposure to the 
Definition treatment and approval of the job the president is doing. Interestingly though, 
a tweet from Donald Trump Jr. was not once linked with negative attitudes about 
bureaucracy from Trump advocates.  
 Tables 1 and 2 also reveal how rarely covariates explained attitudes toward the 4 
departments and agencies under examination. Race, gender, sexual orientation, 
education, religiosity, and party identification are insignificant across all 12 models. Older 
individuals are more likely to believe the State Department is serving the American 
people. Individuals in households with higher incomes are more likely to trust the 
Department of Justice. More conservative individuals are more likely to approve of the 
job Attorney General William Barr is doing, while those who watch more news are more 
likely to disapprove.8 
Additional data from this experiment allow us to consider if participants reported 
familiarity with the idea of a deep state before taking the survey, as well as whether they 
believed in the existence of a deep state. Of the respondents in the 3 treatment groups, 
55% were “somewhat familiar” with the term “deep state,” while the remaining 45% were 
split nearly equally between “not familiar” and “very familiar.” Nearly three-quarters 
(74%) stated that a deep state probably exists or definitely exists.9 Noticeably more of 
these individuals (close to double, in fact) were in the “probably” group than were the 
“definitely” group though. Only a little over 5% said a deep state definitely does not exist, 
 
8 The inclusion of interactions between age and receiving the treatments revealed no instances in 
which younger respondents reacted differently than older respondents to the Deep State information. 
The inclusion of interactions between education and receiving the treatments revealed a single 
instance (out of 36 possible) where the highly educated reacted differently than the poorly educated 
to the Deep State information; in this lone instance, the results presented in this paper are not 
affected in terms of significance or lack thereof by the inclusion of this interaction.   
9 As stated earlier, only respondents in the 3 treatment groups were asked general questions about 
the deep state concept.  
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leaving just over 20% in the “probably does not exist” group. There were no significant 














Definition .58 (.66) .09 (.77) .14 (.65) .95 (.64) .66 (.73) .86 (.68) 
Expert 1.61* (.69) 1.31 (.79) 1.43* (.71) .43 (.70) 1.17 (.77) .65 (.73) 
Partisan .04 (.68) .27 (.79) .02 (.68) -.61 (.68) .11 (.76) .05 (.72) 
Age .01 (.01) .02 (.01) -.00 (.01) .01 (.01) .03* (.01) .02 (.01) 
Income .17 (.09) -.02 (.10) -.02 (.09) .05 (.08) -.09 (.10) -.00 (.09) 
Race -.12 (.26) .07 (.29) .14 (.27) .01 (.26) -.07 (.28) .24 (.27) 
Gender .07 (.23) -.14 (.27) -.10 (.24) .04 (.23) .11 (.25) -.04 (.24) 
Sexual Orientation .40 (.37) .45 (.42) .31 (.36) .24 (.36) .38 (.40) .36 (.38) 
Education -.01 (.08) .01 (.09) .02 (.08) .12 (.07) .01 (.08) .05 (.08) 
Religiosity -.12 (.09) -.14 (.10) -.14 (.09) -.13 (.09) -.11 (.10) -.15 (.09) 
Ideology .06 (.10) .09 (.12) .11 (.11) -.14 (.10) -.14 (.12) .11 (.11) 
Party ID .06 (.10) .12 (.12) .17 (.11) .10 (.11) .17 (.12) .11 (.11) 
News -.01 (.07) -.12 (.08) .05 (.07) .03 (.07) -.05 (.07) -.11 (.07) 
Trump .50 (.27) .57 (.31) .70* (.28) .47 (.27) .44 (.30) 1.05* (.28) 
TrumpXDefinition -.10 (.32) -.07 (.39) -.13 (.33) -.44 (.32) -.30 (.36) -.58 (.34) 
TrumpXExpert -.69* (.33) -.65 (.39) -.74*(.35) -.36 (.34) -.69 (.38) -.47 (.35) 
TrumpXPartisan .22 (.35) -.12 (.39) -.04 (.34) .25 (.33) -.02 (.37) -.22 (.35) 
N=322. * = p < .05. Trust is a 3-point scale ranging from untrustworthy to trustworthy. Serve is a 2-point 
scale ranging from “preserving their own power and status” to “helping serve the American people.” 
Approval is a 3-point scale ranging from disapprove to approve. Trust and Approval are ordered logit 
models; Serve is a logit model. On race, white=1. On gender, male=1. On sexual orientation, 
heterosexual=1.  
Table 1 Effects of Deep State Information on Attitudes Toward Defense and State 
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Definition .89 (.64) .56 (.73) .77 (.70)     -.05 (.66) .57 (.72) 1.01 (.66) 
Expert .78 (.71) 1.36 (.77) 1.10 (.74) .38 (.70) 1.66* (.77) -.16 (.69) 
Partisan -.13 (.68) -.26 (.77) .11 (.73) -.21 (.68) .02 (.77) -1.52* (.68) 
Age -.00 (.01) .01 (.01) .02 (.01) .01 (.01) .02 (.01) .02 (.01) 
Income .16* (.08) .01 (.10) .03 (.09) .14 (.09) .12 (.09) .04 (.09) 
Race -.04 (.25) .19 (.29) .01 (.27) -.17 (.25) -.34 (.28) .16 (.26) 
Gender .00 (.23) .16 (.26) -.01 (.24) -.06 (.23) -.20 (.25) .27 (.23) 
Sexual Orientation .01 (.36) -.41 (.40) .20 (.38) .33 (.37) .54 (.41) -.00 (.36) 
Education .04 (.07) .11 (.08) .05 (.08) -.02 (.08) -.03 (.08) .05 (.07) 
Religiosity -.15 (.09) -.11 (.10) -.14 (.09) -.15 (.19) .08 (.10) -.10 (.09) 
Ideology -.19 (.11) .19 (.12) .23* (.11) .02 (.10) -.06 (.12) .00 (.11) 
Party ID .14 (.11) -.13 (.12) .08 (.11) .01 (.11) .14 (.12) .08 (.10) 
News .01 (.07) .00 (.07) -.18* (.07) .01 (.07) .02 (.08) .01 (.07) 
Trump .70* (.27) .69* (.30) 1.07* (.29) -.06 (.27) .35 (.30) .26 (.28) 
TrumpXDefinition -.70* (.32) -.56 (.36) -.45 (.35) .07 (.33) -.22 (.35) -.45 (.34) 
TrumpXExpert -.49 (.35) -.80* (.38) -.61 (.36) -.26 (.34) -.98* (.39) -.23 (.35) 
TrumpXPartisan -.02 (.34) .12 (.39) -.05 (.37) .13 (.33) -.11 (.37) .66 (.35) 
N=322. * = p < .05. Trust is a 3-point scale ranging from untrustworthy to trustworthy. Serve is a 2-point 
scale ranging from “preserving their own power and status” to “helping serve the American people.” 
Approval is a 3-point scale ranging from disapprove to approve. Trust and Approval are ordered logit 
models; Serve is a logit model. On race, white=1. On gender, male=1. On sexual orientation, 
heterosexual=1.  
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Discussion 
In total, the findings presented in the previous section offer preliminary evidence that the 
effect of the deep state concept on attitudes toward government is limited in nature. 
Exposure to deep state information itself is rarely significant. The same goes for the 
interaction between exposure and presidential job approval. Generally speaking, efforts 
at disseminating deep state propaganda to assassinate the character of bureaucratic 
agencies and their leaders appear, for the most part, to fail. 
There are, however, some trends worth noting when relationships are significant. 
Of the three treatment types, the Expert information from the media is more likely to have 
an impact on attitudes than the straightforward Definition information or the Partisan 
information from Donald Trump, Jr.’s Twitter account. When exposure to the Expert 
information is significant, it is always linked with stronger support for bureaucracy 
broadly defined. When it is interacted with presidential job approval, however, it always 
signals a backlash against bureaucracy for those who support the job the president is 
doing. Ellul’s (1965) research on propaganda notes the central role of mass media in 
accomplishing goals. Exposure to the media account of the deep state has the most power, 
and that power can cut in either direction. The nature of the significant interactions 
reveals that for those pushing the idea of the deep state in an attempt to undermine the 
character of departments and agencies, this only seems to work as intended on a subset 
of the population (Trump supporters). The use of this propaganda, however, risks broader 
backlash in some cases as well. The fact that, at times, information on the deep state does 
work on such a specific partisan subset lends credence to arguments made by 
Pornpitakpan (2004) regarding in-group source credibility, van Prooijen and van Dijk 
(2014) regarding conspiracy theory acceptance in the face of threats to one’s group, as 
well as Stanley (2015), who stated more specifically that the American two-party system 
has created strong group identities that allow for susceptibility to propaganda.  
 What emerges from this pattern of findings in terms of the literature and theories 
discussed earlier is that the belief that tying federal departments and agencies to the idea 
of a deep state will regularly diminish the reputation of various entities within the 
bureaucracy appears to be misguided. Instead, the impacts seem irregular and 
unpredictable. In some cases, reading about the idea of a deep state (especially via media 
experts) was linked with respondents supporting departments, agencies, and their 
leaders. If some hope to use the idea of a deep state as part of a propaganda effort to 
damage the standing and assassinate the character of bureaucracy and bureaucrats, the 
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ability to do so might be dependent on whether the individual being targeted has positive 
feelings toward President Trump. This suggests a narrow playing field, perhaps one in 
which media discussion of the idea of a deep state solely builds antigovernment sentiment 
amongst those already on the side of the White House.  
Future Directions 
One caveat to these findings lies in the experimental design itself, which only asks about 
attitudes toward departments, agencies, and their leaders after the informational 
treatments. A future variation on this experiment could ask respondents for their 
thoughts on the deep state and on bureaucratic agencies, then offer information, and 
repeat the same survey questions (either immediately or after some time) to determine if 
and how opinions are changed. Such a variation would allow research to speak more 
deeply to the idea of opinion change. We know that changes in partisan control are linked 
with belief in conspiracies (DiGrazia, 2017), so considering who is in the White House and 
for how long is also something to account for in future research. The survey in this 
research was conducted just over 2.5 years into the Trump presidency; had it been 
executed in 2017 or mid-2020, responses might have differed. Were the Democrats to win 
back the White House following the 2020 presidential election, findings might change 
entirely.  
Another possible path for future research on this topic to consider is the power of 
varying volumes of deep state messaging on public opinion toward bureaucracy. The 
survey experiment presented here is one in which a single definition, news story, or tweet 
is given to respondents. We know, however, that discussions of the deep state ebb and 
flow over time. New controversies appear and new conflicts arise between presidents and 
federal departments and agencies. Scholars conducting longitudinal public opinion 
surveys could regularly ask questions about the deep state or about bureaucracy, then link 
that to the flow of discussion about the deep state in media or on social media. Varying 
survey experiments could test the impact of hearing about the state from different sources 
other than the ones used here, or multiple sources simultaneously. Such studies would 
give us even richer and deeper knowledge on the impact of this concept than what is able 
to be derived in this research. Subsequent versions of the work presented here would be 
wise to consider how other attitudes toward politics and the state of the nation today 
might influence attitudes toward bureaucracy as well. One’s feelings about the present 
and future might make one more susceptible to the arguments made by those claiming a 
deep state exists and has impact. Work like that of DiGrazia (2017) on individual-level 
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feelings of threat and insecurity and propensity to believe in conspiracies could be 
integrated into future iterations of survey design. Finally, future research might test the 
effect of information arguing against the presence of a deep state as well, to see if it 
converts those who once believed or only serves to harden their opinions, akin to findings 
of those like Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter (1956).  
Subsequent attempts at research of this sort could also consider the survey sample 
itself. Future research might utilize other survey populations beyond that of Amazon 
Mechanical Turk for the purpose of replication, allowing us to confirm these initial 
findings. There are also ways in which more focused analyses on survey subsamples might 
also prove interesting regarding this phenomenon. A survey focused solely on presidential 
co-partisans, for example, would give researchers greater statistical power how efforts to 
attack the character and undermine the reputation of departments and agencies via links 
to a deep state have potency amongst those on the right. Ellul (1965) notes how 
propaganda “standardizes current ideas, hardens prevailing stereotypes, and furnishes 
thought patterns in all areas” (p.163). One could perceive how discussion of the deep state 
might exacerbate previously held feelings about government of this sort amongst those 
who support the president no matter what. This might also prove to be fertile ground for 
seeing if different experts from the ones utilized here might have even more or less impact. 
One could easily envision a story on the deep state coming from The New York Times or 
The Washington Post being deemed “fake news” and not shaping the opinions of Trump 
supporters, but a message from Fox News being particularly potent. 
Conclusion 
What then of the conversation about the deep state moving forward? Even though the 
findings here suggest that it mostly fails to move the needle in terms of shaping the 
reputation (let alone assassinating the character) of most of its bureaucratic targets, we 
should undoubtedly expect it to live on (and probably even after Donald Trump’s time in 
the White House comes to an end). In fact, during the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, 
government experts like Dr. Anthony Fauci were accused of being a member of the deep 
state (Broderick, 2020), and the deep state was described as a co-conspirator (along with 
China, George Soros, the World Health Organization, Bill Gates, and Bill and Hillary 
Clinton) in a plot to control the world’s population by controlling potential coronavirus 
cures (Fried, 2020). Its future as an implement in the propaganda and character 
assassination toolkit may lie in its simplicity. It appears flexible enough to be applied to 
any department, agency, bureaucrat, or politician. It can be rooted in existing feelings 
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about government, American history, or current events. It provides a natural foil for 
politicians to rally against. It makes for an interesting story to a media seeking to gain and 
maintain audiences. It attracts the portion of the public that is intrigued by conspiracy 
theorizing. What we shouldn’t expect, however, is for it to do lasting damage on the jobs 
that those in federal departments and agencies do every day in executing the laws and 
executive orders authorized by presidents past and present.  
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Appendix A: Experimental Prompts 
Prompt 1: Definition 
A deep state (from Turkish: derin devlet), also known as a state within a state, is a form 
of clandestine government made up of hidden or covert networks of power operating 
independently of a state’s political leadership, in pursuit of their own agenda and goals. 
Examples include organs of state, such as the armed forces or public authorities 
(intelligence agencies, policy, secret police, administrative agencies, and government 
bureaucracy). A deep state can also take the form of entrenched, career civil servants 
acting in a non-conspiratorial manner, to further their own interests. The intent of a deep 
state can include continuity of the state itself, job security for its members, enhanced 
power and authority, and the pursuit of ideological objectives. It can operate in opposition 
to the agenda of elected officials, by obstructing, resisting, and subverting their policies, 
conditions, and directives. It can also take the form of government-owned corporations 
or private companies that act independently of regulatory or governmental control.  
Prompt 2: Expert (Definition + News Story) 
WASHINGTON – A wave of leaks from government officials has hobbled the Trump 
administration, leading some to draw comparisons to countries like Egypt, Turkey, and 
Pakistan, where shadowy networks within government bureaucracies, often referred to as 
“deep states,” undermine and coerce elected governments. 
 So is the United States seeing the rise of its own deep state? 
 Though leaks can be a normal and healthy check on a president’s power, what’s 
happening now extends much further. The United States, those experts warn, risks 
developing an entrenched culture of conflict between the president and his own 
bureaucracy. 
 Though American democracy is resilient enough to resist such clashes, early hints 
of a conflict can be tricky to spot because some push and pull between a president and his 
or her agencies is normal. 
 In 2009, for instance, military officials used leaks to pressure the White House over 
what it saw as the minimal number of troops necessary to send to Afghanistan. 
 Leaks can also be an emergency brake on policies that officials believe could be ill-
advised or unlawful, such as George W. Bush-era programs on warrantless wiretapping 
and the Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq.  
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 “You want these people to be fighting like cats and dogs over what the best policy 
is, airing their views, making their case and then, when it’s over, accepting the decision 
and implementing it,” said Elizabeth N. Saunders, a George Washington University 
political scientist. “That’s the way it’s supposed to work.” 
 “Leaking is not new,” she said, “but this level of leaking is pretty unprecedented.” 
 Institutional conflicts under Mr. Trump, she worried, had grown into something 
larger and more concerning. 
 Officials, deprived of the usual levers for shaping policies that are supposed to be 
their purview, are left with little other than leaking. And the frenetic pace of Mr. Trump’s 
executive orders, which the agencies would normally review internally over weeks or 
months, has them pulling that lever repeatedly. 
 They have leaked draft executive orders, inciting backlashes that led the orders to 
be shelved. And they have revealed administration efforts to circumvent usual 
policymaking channels, undermining Mr. Trump’s ability to enact his agenda.  
Prompt 3: Partisan (Definition + Trump Jr. Retweet) 
 Donald Trump Jr. 
 @DonaldJTrumpJr 
If there was ever confirmation that the Deep State is real, illegal & 
endangers national security, it’s this. Their interests above all else. 
 DRUDGE REPORT @DRUDGE_REPORT 7/6/17 
Admin Hit With AT LEAST One National Security Leak a Day… 
drudge.tw/2tRG9K8 
 5:18 PM 7/7/17 Twitter for iPhone 
Appendix B: Survey Questions of Interest 
“As it stands right now, do you think that unelected or appointed officials in the federal 
government have too much influence in determining federal policy or is there the right 
balance of influence between elected and unelected officials?”  
a) unelected or appointed officials have too much influence 
b) right balance of influence between elected and unelected officials 
Journal of Applied Social Theory, Vol. 1, 2021 
92 
 
“How much latitude should new presidents of one party have in replacing government 
officials who took their positions under the administration of an opposing party?” 
a) none at all  
b) a little  
c) a moderate amount  
d) a lot  
e) a great deal 
 
“Do you approve or disapprove of the job these federal appointees (Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo, Attorney General William Barr, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Gina 
Haspel, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper) are doing?”  
a) disapprove  
b) neither approve nor disapprove  
c) approve 
 
“To what extent do you find these federal departments and agencies (Department of State, 
Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Defense) 
trustworthy?” 
 a) untrustworthy  
b) neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy  
c) trustworthy 
 
“What do you believe is a higher priority for these federal departments and agencies 
(Department of State, Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
Department of Defense): preserving their own power and status, or helping serve the 
American people?” 
a) preserving their own power and status 
b) helping serve the American people 
 
“Do you believe a deep state in the federal government definitely exists, probably exists, 
probably doesn’t exist, or definitely doesn’t exist?” 
a) definitely doesn’t exist  
b) probably doesn’t exist  
c) probably exists  
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d) definitely exists 
 
“Before taking this survey, to what extent were you familiar with the term ‘deep state’ as 
it applies to the federal government?” 
a) not familiar  
b) somewhat familiar  
c) very familiar 
 
